Fight for the Future and some other civil society groups used Zoom for a teleconference to call on Zoom to institute end-to-end encryption (E2EE) for its teleconferences given its use to bridge physical distancing in a socially distanced COVID-19 reality.

The groups, which also included the Media Alliance, Color Of Change, praised security improvements that Zoom has made, including stronger encryption and greater control over the Zoom room, like being able to lock meetings, after security flaws were put under the magnifying glass of the pandemic.

Still, they said Zoom did not go far enough.

“While zoom has improved their security, we need end-to-end encryption to talk with our friends and loved ones without second guessing everything we say and worrying that someone else may be listening," said Surveillance Technology Oversight Project executive director Albert Fox Cahn. "Encryption has always been indispensable to secure communication, but today it’s more crucial than ever.”

“Zoom has an opportunity to lead the way in video conferencing security. But to do so, they have to implement default end to end encryption. Implementing end to end encryption is the only way to guarantee user security and the most important thing Zoom could do to keep people safe," said FFTF deputy director Evan Greer.

The tension between protecting online and device privacy and helping law enforcement track down criminal activity was on display Thursday (Oct. 3). 

That came after Attorney General Bill Barr planned to join with other countries in a letter asking Facebook not to deploy end-to-end encryption. 

Related: DOJ Fires New Encryption Warning Shot at Silicon Valley 

The Computer & Communications Industry Association, whose members include Facebook, said it was "dismayed" by Barr's opposition to strong encryption, though the Justice Department has made it clear in the case of Apple and its reluctance to provide back doors to device security that it needs access to info, whether in devices or elsewhere.  

“Strong encryption is increasingly vital to the privacy and security of individuals, national security and economic prosperity," said CCIA President Ed Black. "Companies should be encouraged to develop and employ the security standards that the public expects for their devices and online activity. ” 

In a speech back in July, Barr said time was running out on warrant-proof encryption and painted a bleak picture of the internet and communications platforms morphing into "law free" zones where criminals "go dark" with impunity leading to more crime, abetted by Big Tech.

The bipartisan Secure Data Act was reintroduced in the House Thursday (May 10).

The bill would prevent law enforcement agencies and courts from forcing tech companies to put encryption work-arounds (so-called "back doors") into communications devices so they could be accessed in investigations into criminal activity.

Products covered by the bill are "any computer hardware, computer software, or electronic device that is made available to the general public."

Related: DOJ's Rosenstein Hammers Warrant-Proof Encryption

Encryption is about securing user data on devices; backdoors are about circumventing those when law enforcement argues it is necessary.

Co-sponsoring the bill were Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.) and Thomas Massie (R-Ky.), who reitroduced the act, joined by original sponors Jerrold Nadler (D-N.Y), Ted Poe (R-Texas), Ted Lieu (D-Calif.) and Matt Gaetz (R-Fla.).

"U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies have requested, required, and even sought court orders against individuals and companies to build a 'backdoor,' weakening secure encryption in their product or service to assist in electronic surveillance," Lofgren and Massie said in a joint announcement. "Today’s legislation comes on the heels of a troubling Department of Justice Office of Inspector General report calling into question the Federal Bureau of Investigation's handling of Syed Rizwan Farook’s locked iPhone in the wake of the 2015 San Bernardino attack which suggested that FBI officials did not pursue available technical solutions to access Farook’s iPhone because the FBI preferred obtaining a precedent-setting court judgement compelling Apple to weaken their product encryption."

There is an exception for requests under CALEA, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act.

"The Secure Data Act will help ensure that in a time of heightened threats to national and digital security, users and businesses are able to rely on strong encryption without the risk of imposed vulnerabilities," said the Computer & Communications Industry Association. "Trust in the integrity and security of the internet, including its infrastructure and users, is essential to its vitality as a global platform for free expression and commerce. A fundamental aspect of that security is the encryption that protects sensitive information, communications, and transactions at rest and in transit."

Apple CEO Tim Cook wasted little time March 21 addressing his company’s current fight with the government, which has the Justice Department and FBI looking to force Apple to unlock an iPhone owned by one of the San Bernardino, Calif. shooters.

Apple and the government will begin arguing their cases March 22.

“We built the iPhone for you, our customers, and we know it’s a very personal device,” Cook said at an Apple event live-streaming over the Internet. “We need to decide as a nation how much power the government should have over our data and our privacy.”

“We did not expect to be in this position, at odds with our government. We owe it to our customers, and we owe it to our country. We will not shrink from this responsibility.”

For more of this story, please visit broadcastingcable.com.

FBI director James Comey said the agency’s push to get more help from Apple in the San Bernardino shooting investigation is about that case, period, but added that a conversation is necessary about the broader issue of warrant-proof spaces.

That came in a House Judiciary Committee hearing in which members of the committee had some tough questions for the director and the agency's effort to force Apple to help investigators access information on an iPhone belonging to one of the alleged San Bernardino shooters.

Both sides of the aisle had tough questions about the issue, including the case-specific details and the broader issues of encryption and privacy.

Comey said balancing the privacy and public safety was the hardest issue he had faced in government, and that ultimately Congress would likely need to address the broader issue.

But he defended the FBI's use of a legal maneuver, the All Writs Act dating from 1789, to force Apple's compliance with a court order that it create what Apple called a backdoor to its encryption and Comey described somewhat differently.

He said the FBI was not looking for Apple to create a back door. He suggested the front door would do, but that Apple had to call off the drooling guard dog so the FBI could try to pick the lock.

Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich.), ranking member of the committee, and Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.), chairman, both expressed concerns that once Apple had complied, the FBI would not stop there, and that other phones' encrypted data would be compromised.

Comey conceded that the case could provide precedent for asking for similar access to other encrypted phones the FBI possesses as part of other investigations, but that that would still require going to court with that fact set.

He also said that in the San Bernardino case, Apple had been cooperative up to a point, beyond which it did not feel it could do what the FBI wanted. At that point, Comey said, the agency used all legal means at its disposal to get the information, and that if he had not done that he should be fired.

Comey made the point repeatedly that for him, the San Bernardino case was about that particular investigation, but that there was a larger conversation to be had about encryption.

He said he saw a time when all info was encrypted, including that of pedophiles and terrorists, and that if the country wanted warrant-proof spaces, there needed to be a conversation about the implications of that.

"The FBI is not an alien force imposed upon America by Mars," he said. His job was to tell people there was a problem with encryption when it came to investigating crimes. "If there are warrant proof spaces," he said, there needs to be broader conversation about  what the consequences of that are."

Rep. Conyers said he felt the FBI was doing an end run on encryption by going the court route, and said he hopedg law enforcement was not trying to leverage a tragedy to achieve a policy change. .

Comey again said efforts to unlock the San Bernardino phone were about that case and that investigation.

Rep. Darrell Issa (R-calif.), who has a security background in the private sector, arguably hammered Comey hardest. He suggested the FBI might not have done enough to access the phone information without forcing a third party, Apple, to do the work for it. Comey said that if investigators had been able to do it themselves, he wouldn't be there, but added that if Issa had any suggestions he hoped his FBI people were listening.

Rep. Steve Chabot (R-Ohio) said that he thought Congress would eventually have to resolve the issue of the limits of privacy in a tech-driven world.

Verizon CEO Lowell McAdam stopped short of taking sides in Apple's legal battle with the Obama Administration over access to encrypted info on the iPhone of one of the San Bernardino shooters, but he blogged his strong support for encryption Monday and said that, bottom line, the government should not have direct access to technological privacy back doors.

Apple is fighting a court order, sought by the FCC, to create a way to hack into the password protected phone.

'[A]ny decisions made about access to those systems need to be considered carefully," McAdam wrote. "Should one government be given access to your personal information or the operations of connected infrastructure? If we say 'yes' to one government, how about others? If governments have access, how can we be confident that those with bad intentions can’t use those same systems to gain access through hacking?"

He said those questions need careful answers given what is at stake, but said that "without taking sides on the Apple case specifically," he said Verizon clearly stands for strong encryption with "no back doors."

"We support the availability of strong encryption with no 'back doors' that would enable government access to private information, which we believe would degrade security and privacy for millions of users," McAdam said.

The administration more broadly has been seeking workarounds to encryption in the case of targeted investigations involving potential threats to life or safety.

As for the specific circumstances of the Apple case -- a single phone of a possible terrorist and how Apple would have to create the back door -- McAdam said that case represents unique policy issues that should be addressed by Congress.

"In particular, there may be legitimate reasons for preventing the destruction of data, such as the investigation of terrorism and serious crimes," he said. But if so, "[t]hese conditions must be strictly defined by law, not arrived at haphazardly on an ad hoc or case-by-case basis, as in the Apple case."

That said, McAdam said Verizon opposed any solution that "would place direct technical access in the hands of law enforcement."

A bipartisan quartet of House members has introduced the Ensuring National Constitutional Rights for Your Private Telecommunications (ENCRYPT) Act of 2016, which would preempt state and local laws banning cell phone encryption circumvention

Reps. Ted Lieu (D-Calif.), Blake Farenthold (R-Tex.), Suzan DelBene (D-Wash.), and Mike Bishop (R-Mich.) introduced the bill Wednesday (Feb. 10), pointing out that California and New York have introduced bills that would effectively ban, or at least allow for circumvention of, encryption on smart phones sold in the state.

Encryption prevents someone other than a cell phone's owner from accessing its information.

That can prevent lost or stolen phones from giving up that info to bad actors, but law enforcement officials say it can also prevent them from going after even worse actors, like terrorists, and have argued they need ways around encryption in cases of national security or life threatening situations.

“A patchwork of 50 different encryption standards is a recipe for disaster that would create new security vulnerabilities, threaten individual privacy and undermine the competitiveness of American innovators,” Congressman Ted Lieu (D-Los Angeles County) said.

“It is bad for law enforcement, bad for technology users, and bad for American technology companies. National issues require national responses. The ENCRYPT Act makes sure that this conversation happens in a place that does not disrupt interstate commerce."

"A patchwork of state laws on encryption will not make us safer. Rather, they open us up to attacks, and weaken our national security, not strengthen it," said Rep. Del Bene.

Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) VP Daniel Castro said state and localities should not be "mandating that companies tamper with the security of their products and services so that government can get access to encrypted user data."

He said the U.S. needs "a uniform policy that encourages the use of encryption, not a patchwork of state policies trying to limit it. The digital economy transcends state lines, and U.S. policy should as well. If states go their own way on encryption policy, it would fragment the U.S. market and interfere with digital commerce. This has to be a national issue.... The United States should be embracing strong encryption, not trying to cripple it."

Berin Szoka of nonprofit tech think tank TechFreedom, cautioned that Congress "should be careful about preempting state laws," but said that the Internet is inherently an interstate medium and "there’s just no reason that states or localities should have any role in regulating Internet services or devices — the way that California, in particular, has been able to impose its regulatory agenda on other states on a host of Internet regulation issues.”

He is also worried that, ENCRYPT Act or no, the FCC could step in and ban encryption if it defined messaging apps like Snapchat as a telecommunications service, as it has Internet access (in its Title II-based Open Internet order). He said the best way to prevent that was for Congress to take that option off the table by reclassifying broadband as an information service.